Author Archive for besanson

11
Mar
10

Paper: Deuda, Default, Inflación

From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis

Newly developed long historical time series on public debt, along with modern data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. The evidence confirms a strong link between banking crises and sovereign default across the economic history of great many countries, advanced and emerging alike. The focus of the analysis is on three related hypotheses tested with both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, private debt surges are a recurring antecedent to banking crises; governments quite contribute to this stage of the borrowing boom. Second, banking crises (both domestic ones and those emanating from international financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises. Indeed, we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing accelerates markedly ahead of a sovereign debt crisis; governments often have “hidden debts” that far exceed the better documented levels of external debt. These hidden debts encompass domestic public debts (which prior to our data were largely undocumented).

Link al Paper

11
Mar
10

Paper: Hedge Funds y Medios

Does Recognition Explain the Media-Coverage Discount? Contrary Evidence from Hedge Funds

Abstract:
Previous studies document a media-coverage discount in the cross-section of stock returns, which is attributed to Merton’s investor-recognition hypothesis. This paper offers a natural experiment for this explanation by focusing on the media coverage of funds, not their underlying positions. Funds are not directly traded by investors; therefore one would not expect an investor-recognition discount in their cross-section. Yet, we document that hedge funds with media coverage underperform no-coverage funds by 3.5% annually over 1999–2008. Although media coverage affects fund flow, underperformance is not channeled through investor fund flow. The effect is more pronounced in funds at the top and bottom of past performance as well as small funds. Since the paper finds that the media-coverage discount in the cross-section of funds is similar to that found in the cross-section of stocks, it follows that Merton’s hypothesis need not be the only explanation for the media-coverage discount.

Link al Paper

08
Mar
10

Derivados y Regulación

Satyajit Das tiene un post muy explicativo en Naked Capitalism sobre el mercado de derivados (OTC), la problemática de valuar mark-to-market, el riesgo de contra-parte y las iniciativas de regulación. Todo muy 2008-2009.

La única objeción es la longitud del mismo.

Aqui algunos extractos:

(…)

In current accounting argot, most derivatives are Level 2 assets (Mark-to-Model). In practice, this means that they cannot be priced based on quoted trade prices (Level 1) but are valued using observable inputs; for example, comparable assets or instruments or using interest rates, volatility, correlation, credit spreads etc that can be put through an accepted model to establish values.

There are significant differences in the complexity of the models and the ability to verify and calibrate inputs. More complex products used sophisticated financial models, often derived from science or statistical methodology. There are frequently differences in choice, exact factorisation and even numerical implementation of the models. Different dealers may use different models.

(…)

Interestingly, MtM accounting is generally not available outside of financial instruments. An often neglected element of the Enron scandal was the company’s ability to convince its auditors and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (”SEC’) to allow MtM accounting to be used in the natural gas industry. This allowed the company to record current earnings based on the future value of long term contracts.

(…)

Where derivative contracts are marked-to-market daily and any gain or loss covered by collateral to minimise performance risk, movements in market rates can trigger large cash requirements. These requirements may be unanticipated. If there is a failure to meet a margin call then the position must be closed out and the collateral applied against the loss. This may leave the parties unhedged against underlying risks or on offsetting positions creating the risk of additional losses.

For example, ACA Financial Guaranty sold protection totalling US$69 billion while having capital resources of around US$425 million. When ACA was downgraded below “A” credit rating, it was required to post collateral of around US$ 1.7 billion. ACA was unable to meet this requirement.

(…)

In 2006, Alan Greenspan expressed shock and horror at the state of settlements in the credit derivative market. He expressed surprise that banks trading CDS seemed to document trades on scraps of paper. The ex-Chairman, perhaps unfamiliar with the reality of financial markets, had difficulty reconciling a technologically advanced business with this “appalling” operational environment.

08
Mar
10

CDS, pros & cons

Rajiv Sethi tiene un interesante post sobre CDS; el mismo cumple el rol de resumir la postura de varios bloggers al respecto.

(…)

Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider.

Any entity (private or public) that faces a maturity mismatch between its expected revenues and debt obligations anticipates having to to roll over its debt periodically. Such an entity could be solvent (in the sense that the present value of its revenue stream exceeds that of its liabilities) and yet face a run on its liquid assets if investors are sufficiently pessimistic about its ability to refinance its debt. More importantly, it may face a present value reversal if the rate of interest that it must pay to borrow rises too much. In this case expectations of default can become self-fulfilling.

(…)

Dudley is speaking here of financial firms, but his arguments hold also for governments that do not have the capacity to issue fiat money. This is the case for state and local governments in the US, as well as individual countries in the eurozone. The main “assets” held by such entities are claims on future tax revenues, which are obviously not marketable. In this case, expectations of default can become self-fulfilling even when solvency would not be a concern if expectations were less pessimistic.

(…)

El autor de este post cita el siguiente paper: The Leverage Cycle.

08
Mar
10

Paper: Mercados y temblores

The Scale of Market Quakes

Abstract
We define a methodology to quantify market activity on a 24 hour basis by defining a scale, the so-called scale of market quakes (SMQ). The SMQ is designed within a framework where we analyse the dynamics of excess price moves from one directional change of price to the next. We use the SMQ to quantify the FX market and evaluate the performance of the proposed methodology at major news announcements. The evolution of SMQ magnitudes from 2003 to 2009 is analysed across major currency pairs.

Link al Paper

08
Mar
10

Paper: Mercados, Diversificación y horizonte temporal

International Diversification Works (in the Long Run)

Abstract:
Investors and financial economists have long debated the benefits of global equity market diversification. Fans argue that diversifying globally reduces portfolio risk without harming long-term return. Some critics counter with the observation that because markets get more correlated during downturns, most of the diversification occurs on the upside when you do not need it, and vanishes on the downside when you do. Certainly, recent events give support to the critics as all markets have suffered. We argue that this observation, while true, misses the big picture. International diversification might not protect you from terrible days, months, or even years, but over longer horizons (which should be more important to investors) where underlying economic growth matters more to returns than short-lived panics or global coordinated events, it protects you quite well.

Link al Paper

05
Mar
10

Make Markets be Markets

Ese es el titulo de un proyecto -de reforma del sistema financiero del Roosevelt Institute. Una reunion que se llevo acabo el miercoles 3 de marzo.

El link al documento.
05
Mar
10

Gráfico du Jour: Deuda & USA

El siguiente gráfico pertenece a una entrada del blog BillShrink.com

(en esta misma entrada hay otros gráficos que también valen la pena ver)

03
Mar
10

ETFs y transparencia

Matt Hougan tiene un post donde cuestona la transparencia adjudicada a los ETFs.

The myth of ETF transparency stems from the fact that ETFs must publish their “creation baskets” at the end of every day. The creation basket is the shopping list of securities—tickers and numbers of shares—an institutional investor (aka, an “Authorized Participant”) must deliver to an ETF issuer if he or she wants to create a tranche of new shares in an ETF. For instance, the creation basket of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEArca: SPY) will likely contain all 500 stocks in the S&P 500 in approximately the same weights as those stocks that exist in the index.

Creation baskets are often extremely close to the actual holdings of a fund, but they don’t have to be. For large-cap domestic equity ETFs, they’re usually identical. But as you move into less liquid areas of the market, a significant gap can develop between the contents of the creation basket and the holdings of the underlying fund, all the way until they are so divergent that the ETF issuer just asks for cash.

02
Mar
10

Paper: Turing Test y Retornos

Is it Real, or is it Randomized?: A Financial Turing Test

Abstract:
We construct a financial “Turing test” to determine whether human subjects can differentiate between actual vs. randomized financial returns. The experiment consists of an online video-game (http:\\arora.ccs.neu.edu) where players are challenged to distinguish actual financial market returns from random temporal permutations of those returns. We find overwhelming statistical evidence (p-values no greater than 0.5%) that subjects can consistently distinguish between the two types of time series, thereby refuting the widespread belief that financial markets “look random”. A key feature of the experiment is that subjects are given immediate feedback regarding the validity of their choices, allowing them to learn and adapt. We suggest that such novel interfaces can harness human capabilities to process and extract information from financial data in ways that computers cannot.

Link al Paper




 

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