30
Nov
09

Critica al Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model

El siguiente post critica al Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (en su version standard) , por no incluir la posibilidad de default:

Standard DSGE models do not include the possibility of default. This column says that makes them useless for analysing financial crises. It proposes explicitly incorporating default and money into the microfoundations of DSGE models so as to offer a new framework for monetary and regulatory policy analysis.

Ver nota.

Por ultimo, el link al paper citado como referencia: Analysis of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: A New Paradigm

25
Nov
09

Paper: Uncertainty and Valuations

Abstract:
The idea that uncertainty about a firm’s long-run profitability could increase its stock valuation has been proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2003) to explain a number of phenomena in financial markets. We further examine this idea by analyzing a simple valuation model for both stocks and bonds, in contrast to the existing studies focusing on stocks only. Unless a firm is deeply in debt, our model implies that uncertainty about a firm’s profitability increases its stock valuation and decreases its bond valuation, where uncertainty’s impact is stronger if the firm’s leverage is higher. Using a number of existing uncertainty proxies in the literature and controlling for volatility, we empirically test these predictions. Consistent with the existing literature, our empirical evidence also supports the positive association of stock valuation and uncertainty for all uncertainty proxies. For only one proxy, our empirical evidence is also broadly consistent with uncertainty being negatively related to bond valuation and more so with greater leverage. However, the results based on all other uncertainty proxies generally (for example firm age) do not show a negative association with bond valuations. These results point to a number directions for further examination.

Link al paper (Bajarlo desde Chicago Booth)

20
Nov
09

Anatomia de una Burbuja

Un analista del Société Générale cita a Charles Kindleberger, autor del clasico Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis, al esbozar la anatomía de una burbuja.

Stage 1 sees “displacement”. Frequently, this comes about through the introduction of a new disruptive technology (e.g. canals, railways, or the internet) although Kindleberger says it doesn”t necessarily have to come from such an innovation. It can arise on the back of greater market liquidity through, for example, financial deregulation.
Stage 2 is the “boom.” A convincing narrative gains traction (e.g. Asian economies are “miracle” Tiger economies; the Internet will change the world; sub-prime mortgages help financial institutions diversify risk). Price movements which seem to confirm the narrative are stoked by credit creation.

Stage 3 is “euphoria.” In the words of Kindleberger, “there is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgement as to see a friend get rich.” This greed sucks people who wouldn’t normally involve themselves in such practice into the mania. More and more people seek to become rich without understanding the process involved. Rationality becomes stretched and increasingly fanciful notions excuse what would ordinarily be considered irrational behaviour.

Stage 4 sees the “crisis.” The insiders originally involved start to sell. Prices level off and begin to fall. Those who bought at the top find themselves pushed out first and their selling eventually cascades down through the remaining believers. Speculators realise prices can no longer rise and the rush to exit is on. To the extent that leverage was used to finance any purchases at irrationally overvalued prices, savage price declines put banks in trouble too.

Stage 5 sees “revulsion” where prices likely overshoot fundamental values on the downside. Scams and frauds are uncovered. Scapegoats are found for the financial distress caused object so richly desired as the bubble inflated becomes an object of ridicule and disgust, along with anyone or anything associated with it.

19
Nov
09

Chart du jour: Algorithmic Trading

18
Nov
09

CDS soberanos

FT Alphaville postea una comparación entre la liquidez  de los CDS -a nivel colectivo- de los mercados desarrollados y emergentes.

Tal vez lo mas rescatable como concepto es lo siguiente:

Remember that, in general, the more liquid sovereign CDS is, the more it is showing signs of financial stress, possibly combined with a significant amount of outstanding national debt and/or changes in its capital structure. Relatively liquid CDS is also a hint that there is agreement within the market about present value, but disagreement about future value due to heightened uncertainty surrounding the country.

Nota completa

17
Nov
09

Merger Arbitrage

El lanzamiento de IQ ARB Merger Arbitrage ETF, le permite al blog Abnormal Returns hacer un rejunte sobre Merger Arbitrage.

Aqui les paso un paper sobre Merger Arbitrage:

Merger Arbitrage and Idiosyncratic Risk (Link bajarlo desde Chicago Booth)

Abstract:

This paper identifies a merger arbitrage risk factor that is superior to market beta in explaining the risks assumed by a merger arbitrage portfolio. Previous research has documented a weak tie between market beta and merger arbitrage returns. Mitchell and Pulvino (2002), for example, note that the beta to a merger arbitrage strategy appear to be nonlinear; they are close to zero in a flat to rising market but large in a falling market. However, when our risk factor is added to market beta in a two-factor risk model, the resulting beta cannot be statistically distinguished from zero in all market conditions.

12
Nov
09

Carry Trade

En una nota sobre el dolar como carry trade, FT Alphaville cita a un analista de Barclays Capital que advierte que no solo hay que mirar el diferencial de tasas sino que tambien como impacta la volatilidad (mirar el spread ajustado por volatilidad)

09
Nov
09

Variance Swaps

Este fue el trabajo presentado por Manu Calderon en la segunda reunion de QFC. Montecarlo Variance Swap Valuation

09
Nov
09

Goldman Sachs y HFT: otra campana

John Hempton explica que el High Frequency front running no explica la totalidad de los ingresos de GS (De paso, le tira un palo al New York Times).

Ver nota.

PD: más alla de los sesgos, tiene una explicacion didactica del HF front running

07
Nov
09

Paper: Entropia y Salarios de los Ejecutivos

Abstract: The high pay packages of U.S. CEOs have raised serious concerns about what would constitute a fair pay. Since the present economic models do not adequately address this fundamental question, we propose a new theory based on statistical mechanics and information theory. We use the principle of maximum entropy to show that the maximally fair pay distribution is lognormal under ideal conditions. This prediction is in agreement with observed data for the bottom 90%–95% of the working population. The theory estimates that the top 35 U.S. CEOs were overpaid by about 129 times their ideal salaries in 2008. We also provide an insight of entropy as a measure of fairness, which is maximized at equilibrium, in an economic system.

Link al paper




 

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